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Abstract 
This article critiques one aspect of the High Court’s reasoning in its landmark 
2010 decision of Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales, namely its 
reliance on ‘accepted doctrine at the time of federation’ to determine the 
‘defining characteristics’ of the state Supreme Courts. I argue that the relevant 
passages in Kirk are ambiguous and capable of two alternative readings, which 
I term the ‘pre-Federation entrenchment theory’ and the ‘on-Federation 
entrenchment theory’. With extensive reference to primary and secondary 
materials from the Federation era, I argue that both theories are flawed and, 
indeed, contrary to accepted doctrine at the time of Federation. Consequently, if 
the holding in Kirk is to be defended, other justifications for the entrenchment 
of judicial review in the state jurisdictions, which were only touched upon in 
Kirk, need to be developed and articulated with greater thoroughness and 
rigour. 
I Introduction 
In 2010 in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales
1
 the High Court 
unanimously held that in each Australian state jurisdiction, where an inferior court 
or state executive decision-maker makes a decision arguably involving 
jurisdictional error, the capacity of the Supreme Court to engage in judicial review 
is constitutionally entrenched.
2
 Kirk overturned the orthodox understanding that 
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1  (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’). 
2  French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ wrote the plurality judgment. Heydon J 
wrote a separate judgment but agreed with the holding described above and the reasoning of the 
majority, which supported it: Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 585, 591–6 (Heydon J). See generally 
Chris Finn, ‘Constitutionalising Supervisory Review at State Level: the End of Hickman?’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 92, 92–102; Wendy Lacey, ‘Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales Breathing 
Life into Kable’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 641; John Basten, ‘The Supervisory 
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state Parliaments have the power to enact strong privative clauses that are effective 
in ousting judicial review on grounds of jurisdictional, as well as non-
jurisdictional, error.
3
 
I do not defend or criticise constitutional originalism in this article, nor do I 
explore different originalist methodologies of constitutional interpretation. Rather, 
I take issue with one of the historical foundations of the Court’s reasoning in Kirk, 
specifically the Court’s reliance on what it termed ‘accepted doctrine at the time of 
federation’,4 concerning the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts. In 
mounting this critique of the High Court’s originalist reasoning in Kirk, I 
acknowledge that the Court in Kirk did not rely on originalist reasoning alone. 
Specifically, the joint judgment also referred to the relationship between the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the state Supreme Courts and the entrenched appellate 
jurisdiction of the High Court under s 73 of the Australian Constitution,
5
 and the 
need to avoid the creation of ‘islands of power immune from supervision and 
restraint’6 which would permit the development of ‘distorted positions’7 and 
compromise the unity of the Australian common law.
8
 Critically, however, the 
High Court claimed that when the Australian Constitution was framed, accepted 
legal doctrine determined that the colonial Supreme Courts’ jurisdiction to issue 
                                                                                                                                
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts’ (2011) 85 Australian Law Journal 273, 274–6, 283–4; Alexander 
Vial, ‘The Minimum Entrenched Supervisory Review of State Supreme Courts: Kirk v Industrial 
Relations Commission (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531’ (2011) 32 Adelaide Law Review 145; Luke Beck, 
‘What is a “Supreme Court of a State”’ (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 295, 299–302. 
3  Subject, arguably, to the so-called ‘Hickman principle’: Darling Casino Ltd v New South Wales 
Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602, 634 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also 
Mitchforce Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2003) 57 NSWLR 212, 228–33 
(Spigelman CJ), 252–4 (Handley); Kirk Group Holdings v Workcover Authority (NSW) (2006) 66 
NSWLR 151, 158 (Spigelman CJ), 169–72 (Basten JA); Matthew Groves, ‘Federal Constitutional 
Influences on State Judicial Review’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 399, 404–5. See generally 
Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South Wales v 
Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 381 (Street CJ); Michael Sexton and Julia 
Quilter, ‘Privative Clauses and State Constitutions’ (2003) 5(4) Constitutional Law and Policy 
Review 69, 71–3; J J Spigelman, ‘The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Public Law 
Review 77, 81–2; Nicholas Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (2010) 34 Melbourne 
University Law Review 870, 876; Finn, above n 2, 102–3; Ronald Sackville, ‘Bills of Rights: 
Chapter III of the Constitution and State Charters’ (2011) 18 Australian Journal of Administrative 
Law 67, 70; George Williams and Andrew Lynch, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 
2010 Term’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1006, 1014–15; Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, ‘The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The Coxford Lecture’ (2011) 24 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 305; Ronald Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State 
Administrative Law’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 127, 128–9; Suri 
Ratnapala and Jonathon Crowe, ‘Broadening the Reach of Chapter III: the Institutional Integrity of 
State Courts and the Constitutional Limits of State Legislative Power’ (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 175, 189–94, 201–15; Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 953–91. 
4  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580. 
5  Ibid 581. See also Groves, above n 3, 411; Basten, above n 2, 276–7; Ratnapala and Crowe, above 
n 3, 201. 
6  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 581. See also at 570. 
7  Ibid 581 quoting Louis Jaffe, ‘Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact’ (1957) 70 
Harvard Law Review 953, 963. See generally Groves, above n 3, 408.  
8  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 581. See also Lacey, above n 2, 656–7. See generally Simon Young and 
Sarah Murray, ‘An Elegant Convergence? The Constitutional Entrenchment of “Jurisdictional 
Error” Review in Australia’ (2011) 11 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 117, 121–2. 
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prerogative writs to correct jurisdictional errors was an essential characteristic of 
those courts; and therefore, any privative clause removing that jurisdiction from a 
Supreme Court would be inconsistent with it being a ‘Supreme Court’, and (after 
Federation) inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that there be a 
Supreme Court in every state.  
In Part II, I extract and analyse the relevant passages in Kirk in which the 
High Court referred to accepted doctrine. I argue that those passages are 
ambiguous, in that they can be interpreted in two ways. I term one interpretation 
the ‘pre-Federation entrenchment theory’, and the other interpretation the ‘on-
Federation entrenchment theory’. In Part III, I argue that the pre-Federation 
entrenchment theory is wrong because it is historically inaccurate. In Part IV, I 
argue that the on-Federation entrenchment theory is arguable, but that the 
originalist justification for it, advanced by the High Court in Kirk, is flawed. 
II The Relevant Passages in Kirk and Their Meaning 
A The Relevant Passages  
The passages in Kirk where the High Court referred to ‘accepted doctrine at the 
time of federation’ concerning the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts 
appear in the joint judgment of French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and 
Bell JJ.
9
  
The High Court reiterated the principle that ch III of the Australian 
Constitution requires that there be a ‘body fitting the description [of] “the Supreme 
Court of the State”’ in each state, and that it is therefore ‘beyond the legislative 
power of a State so to alter the constitution or character of its Supreme Court that it 
ceases to meet the constitutional description’.10 The Court then stated:  
At federation, each of the Supreme Courts referred to in s 73 of the 
Constitution had jurisdiction that included such jurisdiction as the Court of 
Queen’s Bench had in England. It followed that each had ‘a general power to 
issue the writ [of certiorari] to any inferior Court’ in the State. Victoria and 
South Australia, intervening, pointed out that statutory privative provisions 
had been enacted by colonial legislatures seeking to cut down the availability 
of certiorari. But in Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan, the Privy Council 
said of such provisions that: 
‘It is, however, scarcely necessary to observe that the effect of [such a 
privative provision] is not absolutely to deprive the Supreme Court of its 
power to issue a writ of certiorari to bring up the proceedings of the inferior 
Court, but to control and limit its action on such writ. There are numerous 
cases in the books which establish that, notwithstanding the privative clause in 
a statute, the Court of Queen’s Bench will grant a certiorari; but some of 
those authorities establish, and none are inconsistent with, the proposition that 
                                                        
9  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580–1. 
10  Ibid 580 quoting Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 
76 (Gummow, Crennan and Hayne JJ). See also Finn, above n 2, 98; Gouliaditis, above n 3, 876–7. 
But see Vial, above n 2, 147, 155–60. 
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in any such case that Court will not quash the order removed, except upon the 
ground either of a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made it, or 
of manifest fraud in the party procuring it.’ (Emphasis added) 
That is, accepted doctrine at the time of federation was that the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Courts to grant certiorari for jurisdictional error was not denied 
by a statutory privative provision.11  
Having made this assertion about ‘accepted doctrine at the time of 
federation’, the Court concluded that ‘the supervisory role of the Supreme Courts 
exercised through the grant of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus (and habeas 
corpus) was, and is, a defining characteristic of those courts’.12 This ‘defining 
characteristic’ then limits the legislative powers of the state Parliaments to enact 
broad privative clauses:  
Legislation which would take from a State Supreme Court power to grant 
relief on account of jurisdictional error is beyond state legislative power. 
Legislation which denies the availability of relief for non-jurisdictional error of 
law appearing on the face of the record is not beyond power.13 
B Interpreting the Relevant Passages 
There are two ways to interpret the passages from Kirk extracted above.  
The first interpretation is that, prior to Federation, the Supreme Courts 
exercised a jurisdiction to grant certiorari to bring up the proceedings of an inferior 
court that could not be removed by the colonial Parliaments because the colonial 
Parliaments lacked the legislative capacity to do so. On this interpretation, some 
form of judicial review was entrenched in the colonial Supreme Courts prior to 
Federation and this entrenchment continued in the state Supreme Courts upon the 
commencement of the Australian Constitution; in other words, Federation changed 
the legal foundations for entrenchment, but not what was entrenched. I term this 
first interpretation the ‘pre-Federation entrenchment theory’. I note that Zines, 
Gouliaditis, Groves, Basten, Sackville, Williams and Lynch appear to have 
interpreted the relevant passages from Kirk consistently with the pre-Federation 
entrenchment theory.
14
  
                                                        
11  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
12  Ibid 581 (emphasis added). See also Finn, above n 2, 98–9; Basten, above n 2, 283–4; Zach Meyers, 
‘Revisiting the Purposes of Judicial Review: Can There Be a Minimum Content to Jurisdictional 
Error?’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 138, 143; Lacey, above n 2, 655–6. 
13  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 581. See also South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 27 (French CJ), 
62 (Gummow J); Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 195 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 
244 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Public Service Association of South Australia v 
Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 289 ALR 1, 10 (French CJ), 17 (Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 20–4 (Heydon J).  
14  Leslie Zines, ‘Recent Developments in Chapter III: Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW 
and SA v Totani’ (Speech delivered at the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies/Australian 
Association of Constitutional Law Seminar, Melbourne, 26 November 2010) 7–9; Gouliaditis, above n 
3, 877–9; Groves, above n 3, 407–8; Basten, above n 2, 284; Sackville, ‘Bills of Rights: Chapter III of 
the Constitution and State Charters’, above n 3, 78; Williams and Lynch, above n 3, 1018. 
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The second interpretation differs from the pre-Federation entrenchment 
theory because it assumes that the colonial Parliaments did have the legislative 
capacity to oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts to grant certiorari to bring 
up the proceedings of an inferior court. On this second interpretation, because 
courts in the colonial era invariably read down privative clauses to preserve this 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts to grant certiorari, this practice can be viewed 
as one of the ‘defining characteristics’ of the Supreme Courts. This defining 
characteristic, which had hitherto been a product of judge-made common law, 
became entrenched by operation of ch III of the Australian Constitution: once the 
Australian Constitution commenced on Federation, the colonial Supreme Courts 
became state Supreme Courts and acquired an entrenched status and entrenched 
characteristics. I term this second interpretation the ‘on-Federation entrenchment 
theory’ and I describe the relevant passages in Kirk, on this second interpretation, as 
advancing an originalist justification for the on-Federation entrenchment theory. I 
note that some contextual support for this second interpretation of the relevant 
passages in Kirk can be found elsewhere in the joint judgment
15
 and that Finn 
appears to interpret Kirk consistently with the on-Federation entrenchment theory.
16
 
III A Critical Assessment of the pre-Federation 
Entrenchment Theory 
In this Part, I argue that the pre-Federation entrenchment theory is inconsistent 
with fundamental and obvious principles of constitutional law. It is important, 
however, to refute the pre-Federation entrenchment theory comprehensively in 
relation to each Australian colony because the majority of commentators appear to 
have interpreted the relevant passages from Kirk as consistent with that theory, 
even though those commentators have also cast doubt upon its correctness.
17
  
A Plenary Legislative Power 
By 1890, each colony had a Parliament that had been conferred with legislative 
power pursuant to imperial legislation. In the colonies of New South Wales, South 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania this conferral of legislative power was 
expressed as a power ‘to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government’ 
of the colony;
18
 in the colony of Western Australia it was expressed as a power ‘to 
                                                        
15  See Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 572. See also Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk v Industrial Relations 
Commission of NSW [2009] HCATrans 237 (29 September 2009) 51 (Gummow J); Transcript of 
Proceedings, Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW [2009] HCATrans 238 (30 September 
2009) 13.  
16  Finn, above n 2, 99. See also Basten, above n 2, 284. 
17  Zines, above n 14, 7–9; Groves, above n 3, 408; Sackville, ‘Bills of Rights: Chapter III of the 
Constitution and State Charters’, above n 3, 78; Williams and Lynch, above n 3, 1018; Basten, 
above n 2, 284; Gouliaditis, above n 3, 877–9; Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of 
Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 190–1. 
18  See, in relation to New South Wales, New South Wales Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) s 1, which 
appears as New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 Vict, c 54, sch 1 (‘New 
South Wales Constitution Statute 1855’); in relation to Tasmania, Australian Constitutions Act 
(No 2) 1850 (Imp) 13 & 14 Vict, c 59, s 14 (‘Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850’); in relation 
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make laws for the peace, order and good government’ of the colony;19 and in the 
colony of Victoria it was expressed as a power ‘to make laws in and for Victoria in 
all cases whatsoever’.20 These phrases appear to be interchangeable.21  
By the 1890s, it was settled law that the colonial Parliaments enjoyed 
plenary legislative powers within each colony commensurate with the plenary 
legislative powers of the imperial Parliament. In 1878 in R v Burah,
22
 in 1883 in 
Hodge v The Queen,
23
 and in 1885 in Riel v The Queen
24
 and Powell v The Apollo 
Candle Co Ltd
25
 the Privy Council repeatedly recognised that a subordinate 
Parliament within the British Empire, conferred with such a broad grant of 
legislative power by the imperial Parliament, exercised ‘authority as plenary and as 
ample … as the imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and 
could bestow’.26 This was clearly ‘accepted doctrine’ in the period immediately 
prior to Federation:
27
 the Privy Council decisions of Burah and Hodge, in 
particular, were famous throughout the common law world, and Privy Council 
decisions were binding on all Australian courts.
28
 In 1988 in Union Steamship 
Company Pty Ltd v King
29
 the High Court unanimously acknowledged that this 
accepted doctrine applied in the colonial era.
30
  
                                                                                                                                
to South Australia, Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 (Imp) 13 & 14 Vict, c 59 s 14, and 
South Australian Constitution Act 1855 (SA) s 1; and in relation to Queensland, Constitution Act 
1867 (Qld) s 2. See generally R D Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States (University of 
Queensland Press, 4th ed, 1977) 81; Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian 
States and Territories (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 42–9, 51–3, 55–7. 
19  Western Australian Constitution Act 1889 (Imp) s 2, which appears as Western Australian 
Constitution Act 1890 (Imp) 53 & 54 Vict, c 26, sch 1. See generally Carney, above n 18, 49–51.  
20  Victorian Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) s 1, which appears as Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 
Vict c 55 sch 1. 
21  Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 9. See also Building 
Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for 
Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 408 (Mahoney JA); Lumb, above n 18, 81. Contra, in 
relation to Victoria, Ian Killey, ‘“Peace, Order and Good Government”: A Limitation on 
Legislative Competence’ (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 24. 
22  (1878) 3 App Cas 889 (‘Burah’). 
23  (1883) 9 App Cas 117 (‘Hodge’). 
24  (1885) 10 App Cas 675. 
25  (1885) 10 App Cas 282. 
26  Hodge (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 132. See also McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 712.  
27  See, eg, A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 5th ed, 
1897) 105–6; Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (Longmans, 
Green, 2nd ed, 1894) 159; W Harrison Moore, The Commonwealth of Australia: Four Lectures on 
the Constitution Bill 1897 (George Robertson, 1897) 45 (‘[T]he Parliament of an Australian Colony 
possesses the widest powers. It dominates the executive and the judiciary, as does the imperial 
Parliament’) (emphasis added).  
28  See Henry Hardcastle, A Treatise on the Construction and Effect of Statute Law (Stevens and 
Haynes, 3rd ed, 1901) 15; Alex Castles, ‘The Reception and Status of English Law in Australia’ 
(1963) 2 Adelaide Law Review 1, 10.  
29  (1988) 166 CLR 1. 
30  Ibid 9–10. See also McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 706; Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR(NSW) 
385, 395 (Herron CJ), 400 (Sugerman JA); Gilbertson v South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66, 82 
(Bray CJ); Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South 
Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 395–7 (Kirby P), 408 
(Mahoney JA); Lumb, above n 18, 81–2. Cf Building Construction Employees and Builders’ 
Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 
372, 382–5 (Street CJ), 421 (Priestley JA). 
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If we begin our assessment of the pre-Federation entrenchment theory with 
the principle stated by the Privy Council in Burah and Hodge, we must focus 
initially on the legislative powers of the imperial Parliament. As Goldsworthy has 
comprehensively demonstrated,
31
 the period around the end of the 19
th
 century was 
the highest of high water marks for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and 
the ‘absolute omnipotence’ of the imperial Parliament was recognised by 
commentators,
32
 Parliamentarians and courts throughout the British Empire, 
including in the Australian colonies.
33
 Thus, it was axiomatic in the late 
19
th
 century that a statute of the imperial Parliament that ousted judicial review in 
either the courts of England or the courts of the colonies was within the legislative 
capacity of the imperial Parliament. Given the legislative omnipotence of the 
imperial Parliament, the question of the effectiveness of privative clauses enacted 
by it was therefore dealt with as a matter of statutory interpretation by the courts, 
not as a matter of legislative competence.
34
  
B The Subordinate Status of the Colonial Parliaments 
1 Introduction 
Of course, none of the colonial Parliaments was absolutely sovereign and the 
plenary legislative powers of the colonial Parliaments could be, and were, limited 
by the imperial Parliament.
35
 We must consider, therefore, whether there were any 
limitations imposed by the imperial Parliament on the legislative powers of the 
                                                        
31  See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 221–8. 
32  See, eg, Dicey, above n 27, 85–6; Todd, above n 27, 245, 301; Hardcastle, above n 28, 78–80; 
Halsbury’s Laws of England (Butterworths, 1909) vol 6, Constitutional Law, ‘Part I — 
Introduction’ 317–18 [458].  
33  See Goldsworthy, above n 31, 221–8. See also Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 
(1996) 189 CLR 51, 71–6 (Dawson J).  
34  See, eg, R v Allen (1812) 15 East 333, 340 (Grose J), 341–2 (Le Blanc J), 342–3 (Bayley J); 104 
ER 870, 873 (Grose J), 873–4 (Le Blanc J), 874 (Bayley J); R v Justices of the Hundred of 
Cashiobury (1823) 3 Dow & Ry 53; 26 RR 604; R v Fowler (1834) 1 Ad & E 836; 110 ER 1427; 
Symonds v Dimsdale (1848) 2 Ex 533; 154 ER 603; R v Badger (1856) 6 El & Bl 137, 171 
(Campbell CJ); 119 ER 816, 828 (Campbell CJ); Manning v Farquharson (1860) 30 LJ QB 22; 126 
RR 849; Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v Cox (1866) LR 2 HL 239, 259 (Willies J); 
Baker v Clark (1873) LR 8 CP 121; Jacobs v Brett (1875) LR 20 Eq 1, 6–11; Evans v Nicholson 
(1875) 32 LT 664; R v Chantrell (1875) 10 QB 587, 589–90; Hawes v Paveley (1876) 1 CPD 418; 
Bridge v Branch (1876) LR 1 CPD 633; Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3 QBD 509, 513 (Cockburn 
CJ); Hedley v Bates (1880) 13 Ch D 498; Chadwick v Ball (1885) 14 QBD 855; Cherry v Endean 
(1886) 54 LT NS 793; R v Bradley (1894) 70 LT NS 379; Skinner v County Court Judge of North-
Allerton [1898] 2 QB 680; Garnsey v Flood [1898] AC 687, 692; Payne v Hogg (1900) 2 QB 43; 
F H Short and F H Mellor, The Practice of the Crown Office (Stevens and Haynes, 1890) 91–2, 
116. See also Gouliaditis, above n 3, 878 n 52; Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, 
De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2007) 184–9; Sir William Wade and 
Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 9th ed, 2004) 712–18. 
35  See generally Dicey, above n 27, 106–13; Todd, above n 27, 29, 159–60, 213, 241–2, 301; Harrison 
Moore, above n 27, 27, 45; Hardcastle, above n 28, 428–9; W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia (Sweet & Maxwell, 1910) 17–18, 45–62. See also Attorney-
General for Queensland v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 148, 166 
(Isaacs J). 
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colonial Parliaments in relation to their capacity to legislate to remove jurisdiction 
from the Supreme Courts. 
At this point our assessment becomes complicated by the fact that the 
Supreme Courts were not all established in the same way. In the colonies of New 
South Wales and Tasmania, the Supreme Courts were established by imperial 
Charters of Justice and were conferred with the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench pursuant to imperial legislation;36 in the colonies of South 
Australia and Western Australia, the Supreme Courts were established and 
conferred with jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench by local Ordinances or 
Acts that were made pursuant to imperial orders in council under the authority of 
imperial legislation;
37
 in the colony of Victoria, the Supreme Court was established 
and conferred with the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench by a local Act 
enacted pursuant to imperial legislation;
38
 and in the colony of Queensland, the 
Supreme Court was established and conferred with jurisdiction by a local Act 
enacted by the Queensland Parliament.
39
 These differences mean that we cannot deal 
with all the colonies in a completely uniform fashion, although I maintain that all of 
the colonial Parliaments were equally free to legislate to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Courts. I propose to proceed with my assessment by making a number of 
observations applicable to all the colonies, before dealing with each in turn.  
2 The Colonial Parliaments Generally  
My first observation is that, in the period between the granting of self-government 
in the colonies and Federation, the colonial Parliaments actually exercised 
extensive legislative powers in relation to the Supreme Courts. In all the colonies, 
the colonial Parliaments used their legislative powers to alter the structure of the 
Supreme Courts, to confer jurisdiction on them, to remove jurisdiction from them 
and to increase the number of Supreme Court justices.
40
 The fact that this 
legislative power was exercised by the colonial Parliaments without any questions 
being raised as to the legislative capacity of any of the Parliaments to do so (with 
the notable exception of the controversy surrounding the judgments of Boothby J 
in South Australia between 1859 and 1865, which was effectively resolved with 
                                                        
36  See, in relation to New South Wales, Charter Establishing Courts of Judicature in New South 
Wales 1823 (Imp) and New South Wales Act 1823 (Imp) 4 Geo 4, c 96 s 2. See, in relation to 
Tasmania, Warrant for Supreme Court in Van Diemen’s Land 1823 (Imp) and New South Wales 
Act 1823 (Imp) 4 Geo 4, c 96 s 2. 
37  See, in relation to South Australia, Supreme Court Act 1837 (SA) s 7; Order in Council 
Establishing Government (UK) (St James Court, 23 February 1836); South Australian Colonisation 
Act 1834 (Imp) 4 & 5 Will 4, c 95, s 2. See, in relation to Western Australia, Supreme Court 
Ordinance 1861 (WA) s 4; Order in Council (UK) (1 November 1830); Government of Western 
Australia Act 1829 (Imp) 10 Geo 4, c 22.  
38  See Supreme Court (Administration) Act 1852 (Vic) s 10; Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 
ss 2, 5, 14.  
39  See Supreme Court Constitution Amendment Act 1861 (Qld) ss 2, 16.  
40  See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1855 (SA); Supreme Court Act 1890 (Vic); Moses v Parker; Ex parte 
Moses [1896] AC 245. See also Moxham v McDonald (1874) 4 QSCR 41, 42 (Lilley CJ); Building 
Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for 
Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 401 (Kirby P) and, in relation to Queensland, 
McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 56–7 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). See generally Alex Castles, An 
Australian Legal History (Law Book, 1982) 326–77.  
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the enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865)
41
 strongly suggests that it 
was accepted doctrine that all the colonial Parliaments enjoyed plenary legislative 
powers in relation to the Supreme Courts.
42
  
My second observation draws upon the decision in Burah, where the Privy 
Council made clear that any limitation on the plenary legislative power of the 
colonial Parliaments in imperial legislation needed to be express, not implied.
43
 
Subject to four exceptions, no imperial legislation applicable to the Australian 
colonies in the 1890s imposed any specific limitation on the legislative powers of 
the colonial Parliaments in relation to the Supreme Courts.
44
 The four exceptions 
related to the admiralty jurisdiction,
45
 appeals to the Privy Council,
46
 offences 
occurring on foreign vessels in Australian territorial waters
47
 and merchant 
shipping.
48
 None of these exceptions is relevant to this assessment of the capacity 
of the colonial Parliaments to oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts to issue 
the prerogative writs. 
My third observation builds upon my second: imperial legislation expressly 
contemplated that the colonial Parliaments could exercise extensive legislative 
powers in relation to all the colonial courts, including the Supreme Courts. 
Specifically, in all of the colonies, with the exception of the colonies of South 
Australia and Queensland, this power was expressly conferred by imperial 
legislation. In the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, it 
was conferred in each colony’s Constitution Act, enacted, in each instance, by the 
imperial Parliament as a schedule to an imperial Act;
49
 in the colony of Tasmania, 
it was conferred prior to responsible government on the colonial Legislative 
Council by the Australian Constitutions Act (No 2), then transferred to the new 
                                                        
41  (Imp) 28 & 29 Vict, c 63 (‘Colonial Laws Validity Act’). See also R v Marais; Ex parte Marais 
[1902] AC 51, 53–4; McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 48–51 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); Castles, 
above n 40, 355–7, 406–12; Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation 
Press, 2004) 51–2; Carney, above n 18, 47, 143; Lumb, above n 18, 89–90. 
42  See, eg, Harrison Moore, above n 27, 45. See also Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 45.  
43  Burah (1878) 3 App Cas 889, 905. See also McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 64 (Isaacs and 
Rich JJ); Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 45. 
44  See generally Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 
45–62. See also Lumb, above n 18, 91–2. 
45  See Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act 1849 (Imp) 12 & 13 Vict, c 96; Courts (Colonial 
Jurisdiction) Act 1874 (Imp) 37 & 38 Vict, c 27; Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp) 
53 & 54 Vict, c 27. See generally Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 35, 54; Castles, above n 40, 363–4. 
46  See Judicial Committee Act 1833 (Imp) 3 & 4 Wm 4, c 41; Judicial Committee Act 1844 (Imp) 7 & 
8 Vict, c 69. 
47  See Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (Imp) 41 & 42 Vict, c 73. 
48  See Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp) 57 & 58 Vict, c 60. See generally Harrison Moore, The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 53; Castles, above n 40, 412, 419–21. 
49  See, in relation to New South Wales, New South Wales Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) s 42, which 
appears as New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 c 54, sch 1; in relation to Victoria, Victorian 
Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) s 41, which appears as Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 Vict, c 55, 
sch 1; and, in relation to Western Australia, Western Australian Constitution Act 1889 (Imp) s 58, 
which appears as Western Australian Constitution Act 1890 (Imp) 53 & 54 Vict, c 26 sch 1. 
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colonial Parliament pursuant the Constitution Act 1855 (Tas) s 1.
50
 Generally, and 
even more significantly, the Colonial Laws Validity Act expressly contemplated 
that all the colonial legislatures could exercise extensive powers in relation to all 
the colonial courts. This was unambiguously stated in s 5: 
Every colonial legislature shall have, and be deemed at all times to have had 
full power within its jurisdiction to establish courts of judicature, and to 
abolish and reconstitute the same, and to alter the constitution thereof, and to 
make provision for the administration of justice therein.  
My fourth observation is that, with the commencement of the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act in 1865, if not previously,
51
 it was clearly established that the 
colonial Parliaments had the power to amend or abrogate all aspects of the 
common law.
52
 The Colonial Laws Validity Act s 3 limited the operation of the 
doctrine of repugnancy to primary and subordinate legislation enacted by the 
imperial Parliament such that no colonial legislation was to be void on the grounds 
that it was repugnant to fundamental features of English law.
53
 There is no reason 
to conclude that the powers of the colonial Parliaments to amend or abrogate the 
common law — those powers being consistent with general notions of the 
parliamentary sovereignty long established by the 1890s
54
 — did not extend to the 
common law of the prerogative writs within the jurisdiction of each colony.  
My fifth observation is that the reported cases from the colonial era about 
the efficacy of privative clauses dealt with the issue as one of statutory 
interpretation, rather than as one of legislative capacity.
55
 I maintain that the Privy 
Council’s 1874 decision in Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan56 supports this 
observation for two reasons. The first is that Willan’s counsel, in argument, 
accepted that the right to certiorari might be taken away by express words and that 
the availability of certiorari was merely a presumption, albeit a strong one, which 
                                                        
50  The Constitution Act 1855 (Tas) was itself enacted by the Legislative Council of the then Van 
Diemen’s Land, pursuant to powers granted under the Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850: 
see Carney, above n 18, 48–9.  
51  See generally McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 48–51 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); Liyanage v The 
Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, 284–5; Castles, above n 40, 406–12. 
52  Lumb, above n 18, 89–90; Dicey, above n 27, 101; Hardcastle, above n 28, 438. See also Riel v The 
Queen (1885) 10 App Cas 675, 678–9; Gilbertson v South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66, 94 
(Walters J); Castles, above n 28, 22–8. 
53  Colonial Laws Validity Act s 3; R v Marais; Ex parte Marais [1902] AC 51, 54; Liyanage v The 
Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, 284–5; Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 35, 47–9; Lumb, above n 18, 90; Castles, above n 28, 22–8; Enid Campbell, 
‘Colonial Legislation and the Laws of England’ (1965) 2 University of Tasmania Law Review 148, 
173–5; Castles, above n 40, 501–2.  
54  See generally Hardcastle, above n 28, 307–8. 
55  See, eg, Re M‘Mullen (1859) 3 QSCR 205, 208; Ex parte Gaynor (1860) 2 Legge 1299, 1300; 
Phillips v Bennett (1866) 1 SALR (Pelham) 75; Hunter v Sherwin (1869) 6 W W & A’B (L) 26, 32 
(Stawell CJ); Ex parte Sempill; Re Wilkinson (1875) 14 NSWSCR (L) 164, 170–1 (Hargrave J); R v 
Bindon, Ex parte Cairns (1879) 5 VLR (L) 93, 97 (Barry J); R v Cope, Ex Parte the Mayor of 
Essendon and Flemington (1881) 7 VLR (L) 337; Ellis v Butler (1887) 21 SALR 136, 137–8 (Way 
CJ), 139 (Boucaut J), 139 (Bundey J); Ex parte Browne (1888) 9 NSWLR (L) 102, 115 (Innes J); 
Re Bell; Ex parte Marine Board of Victoria (1892) 18 VLR 432, 440 (Hodges J); Re Biel (1893) 18 
VLR 456. See also William Irvine and David Wanliss, Irvine’s Justices of the Peace (Maxwell, 2nd 
ed, 1899) 284–5. See generally Goldsworthy, above n 3, 306. 
56  (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 433 (‘Willan’). 
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had not been displaced in this instance.
57
 The second is that, if the Privy Council 
had intended to move away from well-established 19
th
-century orthodoxies 
concerning parliamentary sovereignty, notwithstanding the concessions made by 
Willan’s counsel, it would do so using much clearer language than that in its 
judgment. I should also add that my interpretation of the Privy Council’s judgment 
in Willan is consistent with the vast majority of subsequent decisions that cite 
Willan as an authority,
58
 and numerous secondary materials that cite or discuss the 
decision.
59
 Indeed, in one such consistent decision, Re Biel,
60
 the Victorian 
Supreme Court cited Willan and determined that a privative clause, cast in wider 
terms than the privative clause at issue before the Privy Council in Willan,
61
 was 
effective to oust judicial review, on grounds of want or excess of jurisdiction, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation.
62
 The fact that Re Biel was not even cited in the 
Court’s judgment in Kirk, let alone distinguished or disapproved, is, in itself, 
noteworthy. Re Biel is a colonial Supreme Court decision that is inconsistent with 
the High Court’s argument about the defining characteristics of the Supreme 
Courts at the time of Federation.
63
 It was cited by counsel in written submissions 
                                                        
57  Ibid 433. 
58  See, eg, Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v Gilchrist, Watt and Sanderson Ltd (1924) 34 
CLR 482, 524–6 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); Architects Registration Board of Victoria v Hutchinson (1925) 
35 CLR 404, 409 (Isaacs J); Wall v The King (No 1) (1927) 39 CLR 245, 256 (Isaacs J); Magrath v 
Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd (1932) 47 CLR 121, 134–5 (Dixon J); Australian Coal and Shale 
Employees’ Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 161, 182 (Starke J); Bruton v 
Policemen’s Association [1945] 3 CLR 437 [48]; R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387, 
398–9 (Dixon J); Canada Safeway Ltd v British Columbia (Labour Relations Board) (1952) 7 WWR 
NS 145, 157 (O’Halloran JA); Coal Miners’ Industrial Union of Workers (WA) v Amalgamated 
Collieries of Western Australia (1960) 104 CLR 437, 442 (Dixon CJ), 454–5 (Menzies J); Rammell v 
Workmen’s Compensation Board (1961) 35 WWR NS 145, 151; 28 DLR (2d) 138, 144–5 
(O’Halloran, JA); R v Commissioner of Police for the Northern Territory (1965) 7 FLR 8, 10–11; R v 
Deland & Dredge; Ex parte Willie (1996) 6 NTLR 72, 77–8; NAAV v Minister for Immigration and 
Indigenous Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 298, 335–7, 366–7 (Beaumont J); Plaintiff S157/2002 v 
Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 484–7 (Gleeson CJ); Applicants A1 and A2 v Brouwer [2007] 
VSC 66 (16 March 2007) [80]–[88] (Gillard J). Cf Re Taraire Block No 1J No 2 [1916] NZLR 46, 55; 
Ex parte Blackwell; Re Hateley [1965] 2 NSWLR 1061, 1063–5. 
59  See, eg, Halsbury’s Laws of England (Butterworths, 1909) vol 10 Crown Practice, ‘Part III — 
Proceedings on the Crown Side of the King’s Bench Division’ 177 [348]; Harrison Moore, The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 96; Gouliaditis, above n 3, 878; Zines, 
above n 14; Sackville, ‘Bills of Rights: Chapter III of the Constitution and State Charters’, above 
n 3, 78; Williams and Lynch, above n 3, 1018; Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State 
Administrative Law’, above n 3, 131; Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 3, 193; Woolf, Jowell and Le 
Sueur, above n 34, 187; A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(Longman, 15th ed, 2011) 721. See also Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 35, 96; Groves, above n 3, 407–8.  
60  (1892) 18 VLR 456. 
61  The privative clause in Re Biel was contained in Licensing Act 1890 (Vic) s 203 and provided that 
‘no determination, order or proceedings under Part II of the Statute shall be removed into the 
Supreme Court for any want or alleged want of jurisdiction, or for any error or alleged error of 
form or substance, or any ground whatsoever’. 
62  Re Biel (1892) 18 VLR 456, 458–60. See also Gouliaditis, above n 3, 878–9. 
63  If the pre-Federation theory is the correct interpretation of the relevant passages, then Re Biel 
clearly should have been overruled. If, however, the on-Federation entrenchment theory is the 
correct interpretation of the relevant passages, than Re Biel should have been distinguished as an 
aberration from the characteristic judicial practice of reading down privative clauses to preserve the 
jurisdiction of colonial Supreme Courts to grant certiorari on grounds of jurisdictional error. 
Cf Finn, above n 2, 100. 
792 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 35:781 
and in argument before the High Court and was the subject of some discussion at 
the hearing.
64
 The lack of any reference to Re Biel in Kirk provides but one 
illustration of the inadequate nature of the Court’s historical analysis, a criticism I 
will take up in more detail in my assessment of the on-Federation entrenchment 
theory in Part IV. 
3 The Colonies of Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia and South 
Australia  
If one applies these five general observations to the colonies of Queensland, 
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia, it is clear that, by the 1890s, the 
Parliaments of those colonies each enjoyed the legislative capacity to enact a broad 
privative clause to remove the availability of the prerogative writs in its Supreme 
Court.  
In the colonies of Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia and South 
Australia, the Supreme Courts were each established and conferred with 
jurisdiction by domestic legislation. As this domestic legislation was made for each 
colony by an authority other than the imperial Parliament, it was ‘colonial law’, 
within the terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act s 1, not imperial law extended 
to the colonies.
65
 Consequently, with the commencement of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act in 1865, if not before, the Parliaments of Queensland, Victoria, 
Western Australia and South Australia had the power to oust the jurisdiction of 
each colony’s Supreme Court by repealing or amending the domestic legislation 
conferring jurisdiction on each Supreme Court. 
In the colony of Queensland specifically, the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court was conferred by a domestic Act of the Queensland Parliament in 1861.
66
 
The Queensland Parliament was vested with plenary legislative power in 1859 by 
an imperial Order in Council
67
 made pursuant to imperial legislation.
68
 In the 
1890s, the jurisdiction of the Queensland Supreme Court could therefore be ousted 
by ordinary legislation of the Queensland Parliament. The power of the 
Queensland Parliament to enact such legislation was confirmed the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act s 5. 
In the colony of Victoria specifically, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
was conferred by a domestic Act of the interim Victorian Legislative Council in 
1852.
69
 The subsequent Victorian Parliament was vested with plenary legislative 
                                                        
64  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk [2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 2009) 18, 20, 33–7, 41–2. See 
also Gouliaditis, above n 3, 879 n 55. 
65  Colonial Laws Validity Act s 1 provided that ‘the terms “legislature” and “colonial legislature” shall 
severally signify the authority, other than the imperial Parliament or Her Majesty in Council, 
competent to make laws for any Colony’. Section 1 then defined the term ‘colonial law’ as 
including ‘laws made for any Colony either by such legislature as aforesaid or by Her Majesty in 
Council’. See also Gilbertson v South Australia [1978] AC 772, 781–3.  
66  See above n 39. 
67  Order in Council ‘[e]mpowering the Governor of Queensland to make laws, and to provide for the 
Administration of Justice in the said Colony’ (Imp) (5 June 1859) s 2. See generally Carney, above 
n 18, 55–7.  
68  New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 s 7. See generally Carney, above n 18, 55–7.  
69  See above n 38.  
2013]  DOCTRINE AT THE TIME OF FEDERATION AND KIRK 793 
power by imperial legislation in 1855.
70
 In 1890, the Victorian Parliament enacted 
the Supreme Court Act 1890 (Vic), re-establishing the Victorian Supreme Court and 
vesting it with the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench.71 In the 1890s, the 
jurisdiction of the Victorian Supreme Court could therefore be ousted by ordinary 
legislation of the Victorian Parliament. The power of the Victorian Parliament to 
legislate in such a way was also implied by the Victorian Constitution Act 1855 
(Imp) s 41, which appears as Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 Vict, c 55 sch1, 
and confirmed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5. 
In the colony of Western Australia specifically, the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court was conferred by a domestic Act of the Western Australian 
Legislative Council in 1861.
72
 The subsequent Western Australian Parliament was 
vested with plenary legislative power in 1890 by imperial legislation.
73
 In the 
1890s, the jurisdiction of the Western Australian Supreme Court could therefore be 
ousted by ordinary legislation of the Western Australian Parliament. The power of 
the Western Australian Parliament to do so was also implied by the Western 
Australian Constitution Act 1889 (Imp) s 58
74
 and confirmed by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act s 5. 
In the colony of South Australia specifically, the jurisdiction of the South 
Australian Supreme Court was conferred by a domestic Act of the South 
Australian Legislative Council in 1837.
75
 The subsequent South Australian 
Parliament was conferred with plenary legislative power pursuant to imperial 
legislation.
76
 In the 1890s, the jurisdiction of the South Australian Supreme Court 
could therefore be ousted by ordinary legislation of the South Australian 
Parliament. The power of the South Australian Parliament to do so was confirmed 
by the Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5. 
4 The Colonies of New South Wales and Tasmania 
The colonial Supreme Court of New South Wales was established by the Charter 
of Justice granted by Letters Patent dated 13
 
October 1823, issued under the New 
South Wales Act 1823 (Imp) 4 Geo 4, c 96.
77
 The Supreme Court of (then) Van 
Diemen’s Land was permanently established by the Charter of Justice granted by 
Letters Patent dated 4
 
March 1831, issued under the Australian Courts Act 1828 
(Imp) 9 Geo 4, c 83.
78
 As we would expect, given that each imperial Act predates 
                                                        
70  Victorian Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) s 1, which appears as Constitution Act 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 
Vict, c 55 sch 1. 
71  Supreme Court Act 1890 (Vic) ss 9, 10, 18. See also Irvine and Wanliss, above n 55, 276. 
72  See above n 37. 
73  Western Australian Constitution Act 1889 (Imp) s 2 which appears as the Western Australian 
Constitution Act 1890 (Imp) 53 & 54 Vict, c 26 sch 1. 
74  Western Australian Constitution Act 1890 (Imp) 53 & 54 Vict, c 26 sch 1. 
75  See above n 37. See generally Gilbertson v South Australia [1978] AC 772, 780–3; Carney, above 
n 18, 52. 
76  Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 (Imp) 13 & 14 Vict, c 59 ss 14, 32. See also Constitution 
Act 1855 (SA) s 1. See generally Carney, above n 18, 52–3. 
77  Twomey, above n 41, 718. See also Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers 
Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372, 411 
(Mahoney JA), 419 (Priestley JA). 
78  Michael Stokes, ‘The Constitution of Tasmania’ (1992) 3 Public Law Review 99, 100.  
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the establishment of a colonial legislature, neither of the imperial Acts makes any 
reference to the prospective powers of a colonial legislature to alter or oust any 
jurisdiction conferred by the imperial Act on the Supreme Courts. However, by the 
time of Federation, the colonial Parliaments of New South Wales and Tasmania 
did enjoy such a power as a consequence of the enactment by the imperial 
Parliament of the Australian Constitution Act 1842 (Imp) 5 & 6 Vict, c 76 
(‘Australian Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842’), the Australian Constitutions Act 
(No 2) 1850 and, in the case of the colony of New South Wales, the New South 
Wales Constitution Statute 1855. Any remaining doubt about the existence of this 
power was removed by the enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act in 1865. 
The colonial Parliaments of New South Wales and Tasmania were, of 
course, bound by the doctrine of repugnancy. This limited their capacity to 
legislate in a manner inconsistent with British law, including, prima facie, the 
imperial legislation that conferred jurisdiction on the colonial Supreme Courts of 
New South Wales and Tasmania. However, it is a basic principle — derived from 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty — that a sovereign Parliament, such as 
the imperial Parliament, cannot bind itself; it is a corollary of that principle that 
subsequent legislation enacted by a sovereign Parliament may supersede or 
displace earlier legislation.
79
 When the imperial Parliament enacted the Australian 
Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842, the Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 and 
the New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855, it specifically provided that the 
legislatures of the colonies of New South Wales and Tasmania would have 
legislative power to alter, abolish or vary the colonial court structure established by 
earlier imperial legislation.
80
 The enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act s 5 
by the imperial Parliament in 1865 merely confirmed that all the colonial 
Parliaments, including the Parliaments of the colonies of New South Wales and 
Tasmania, enjoyed plenary legislative power in relation to their courts, even if 
those courts had imperial origins.
81
  
The pre-Federation entrenchment theory is impossible to sustain in relation 
to each of the six Australian colonies. It is inconsistent with elementary principles 
of constitutional law. 
IV A Critical Analysis of the on-Federation Entrenchment 
Theory 
The on-Federation entrenchment theory rests on the interpretative practices of 
judges at the time of Federation and not the legislative capacities of the colonial 
Parliaments, and is therefore at least arguable, unlike the pre-Federation 
                                                        
79  See generally D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 
2011) 263–72. 
80  See Australian Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842 s 53; Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp) 9 Geo 4, c 83 
ss 1, 3; Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 s 29; New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 
s 42 which appears as New South Wales Constitution Statute 1855 (Imp) 18 & 19 Vict, c 54 sch 1. 
See also Baxter v New South Wales Clickers’ Association (1909) 10 CLR 114, 118–19 (Wise KC) 
(during argument), 162 (Isaacs J) (‘Baxter’). 
81  See also McCawley v The King (1918) 26 CLR 9, 44, 48–53 (Isaacs and Rich JJ); McCawley v The King 
[1920] AC 691; Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 385, 401 (Sugerman JA); Dicey, above n 32, 101. 
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entrenchment theory.
82
 It is arguable for a number of reasons: it has some degree of 
historical veracity; it is consistent with the notion that the common law is an 
assumption of constitutional interpretation; and it builds upon a body of High 
Court jurisprudence concerning the relationship between the Australian 
Constitution and the state Supreme Courts.  
At the time of Federation, it was the (almost) universal practice of courts,
83
 
in both Australia and the United Kingdom, to read down privative clauses so as to 
preserve some form of judicial review.
84
 This interpretative practice forms part of 
the ‘common law for the construction of statutes’.85 As the common law, and in 
particular, the common law at the time of Federation, is a legitimate contextual aid 
in the interpretation of the Australian Constitution,
86
 the existence of this 
fundamental interpretative practice can legitimately be used to interpret the 
references to the state Supreme Courts in the Australian Constitution s 73.  
However, while the on-Federation entrenchment theory is arguable, the 
originalist justification for the theory advanced by the High Court in Kirk is flawed 
in at least two respects. The first flaw relates to the contemporary materials from 
the time of Federation and the second to the Court’s failure to engage with the 
emergence and evolution of administrative law in the period from Federation to the 
present day.  
A Contemporary Materials and Historical Analysis  
There is no authoritative contemporary material from the Federation period to 
support the on-Federation entrenchment theory. There is nothing, for example, in 
the Australian Constitutional Convention Debates of the 1890s, nor in W Harrison 
Moore’s Four Lectures on the Constitution Bill 1897,87 nor in Quick and Garran’s 
Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia published in 1901.
88
 
Indeed, it is directly contradicted by a passage in W Harrison Moore’s The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia
89
 published in 1910. More 
significantly, High Court precedents from the first decade of Federation directly 
contradict the theory. 
                                                        
82  See also Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 3, 194. 
83  My qualification relates to Re Biel (1892) 18 VLR 456. See also Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk 
[2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 2009) 41–2. See generally Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 3, 193–4. 
84  See, in relation to courts in the United Kingdom, above n 34 and, in relation to Australian courts, 
above n 55. 
85  Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk [2009] HCATrans 239 (1 October 2009) 41. 
86  See, eg, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (1920) 
28 CLR 129, 149, 152 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 567–9. See also Basten, above n 2, 281–3. 
87  See generally Harrison Moore, above n 27, 30–6, 45–6. 
88  Sir John Quick and Robert Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
(Angus & Robertson, 1901). 
89  Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 15 (‘[T]he 
position of the state Governments is different. They are not created and established by the 
[Australian Constitution]; their executive and judiciary are not co-ordinate with, but subordinate to 
the state Parliament’ (emphasis added). See also at 6.  
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In the first decade after Federation, the High Court handed down two 
lengthy decisions that considered the effectiveness of strong privative clauses 
enacted in New South Wales that purported to oust the jurisdiction of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court.
90
  
In Clancy, the High Court was called upon to determine the effectiveness of 
a broad ‘no certiorari’ clause in the Industrial Arbitration Act 1901 (NSW), which 
purported to protect decisions of the New South Wales Court of Arbitration from 
judicial review in the New South Wales Supreme Court.
91
 The Court found that the 
‘no certiorari’ clause did not oust the jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court to interfere when the New South Wales Court of Arbitration exceeded its 
jurisdiction, but came to that conclusion as a matter of statutory construction.
92
 
While Griffith CJ did not expressly address the question of the legislative 
competence of the New South Wales Parliament to enact a privative clause ousting 
judicial review in the New South Wales Supreme Court where an inferior court 
exceeds its jurisdiction, it is implicit in his reasoning that the New South Wales 
Parliament did have such a power, given his Honour’s reliance on the orthodox 
interpretative touchstone of legislative intent to read down the no certiorari 
clause.
93
 Certainly the Chief Justice did not reject the respondents’ submissions 
that the New South Wales Parliament had the legislative capacity completely to 
oust the jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme Court.
94
 Barton J, in a very 
brief judgment, adopted the reasoning of the Chief Justice.
95
 By contrast, 
O’Connor J was more explicit: his Honour expressly acknowledged that the New 
South Wales Parliament had the power to oust the jurisdiction of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court to keep inferior courts within their jurisdiction.
96
  
In response to the High Court’s decision in Clancy, the New South Wales 
Parliament enacted the Industrial Disputes Act 1908 (NSW), which contained an 
even more strongly worded privative clause than that in the Industrial Arbitration 
Act 1901 (NSW).
97
 The effect of this new clause became the subject of litigation in 
the High Court in Baxter. Although the Court’s comments about the effectiveness 
of the new privative clause are obiter — because the Court decided, as a matter of 
statutory construction, that the old privative clause applied to the impugned 
decision of the New South Wales Industrial Court
98
 — the question of the 
effectiveness of the new privative clause was fully argued, and the Court’s 
comments on its effectiveness are detailed and instructive. While Griffith CJ and 
Barton J expressed some disquiet with the notion that the New South Wales 
                                                        
90  Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union (1904) 1 CLR 181 (‘Clancy’) and Baxter v (1909) 10 
CLR 114 (‘Baxter’). 
91  Industrial Arbitration Act 1901 (NSW) s 32. See generally Sexton and Quilter, above n 3, 69–70.  
92  Clancy (1904) 1 CLR 181, 196–7 (Griffith CJ), 203–4 (Barton J), 204–5 (O’Connor J). 
93  Ibid 196–7. 
94  Ibid 187–8 (Piddington), 194 (Delohery) (during argument). 
95  Ibid 203–4. 
96  ‘It is within the power of the legislature, if it thinks fit, to make the Arbitration Court the sole judge 
of the extent of its own jurisdiction’: ibid 204. 
97  Industrial Disputes Act 1908 (NSW) s 52. See generally Sexton and Quilter, above n 3, 69–70.  
98  Baxter (1909) 10 CLR 114, 125–31 (Griffith CJ), 134–9 (Barton J), 149–50 (O’Connor J) contra 
162–6 (Isaacs J). See also Sexton and Quilter, above n 3, 70.  
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Parliament could create a court of unchallengeable jurisdiction,
99
 neither identified 
any constitutional limitation on the New South Wales Parliament’s powers to do 
so. Indeed, Barton J, along with O’Connor and Isaacs JJ, expressly affirmed the 
power of the New South Wales Parliament to create courts of unlimited 
jurisdiction.
100
 Using language, in 1909, that is utterly inconsistent with the Court’s 
assertion in Kirk in 2010 about accepted doctrine at the time of Federation, both 
Barton and O’Connor JJ regarded it as self-evident that the New South Wales 
Parliament could create inferior courts of unlimited jurisdiction free from the 
supervision of the New South Wales Supreme Court.
101
 All justices dealt with the 
question of the effectiveness of the new privative clause as a question of statutory 
construction,
102
 and all justices, save Barton J who equivocated on the point,
103
 
concluded that the new privative clause was effective to limit the power of the 
New South Wales Supreme Court to review decisions of the New South Wales 
Industrial Court.
104 
 
The High Court is, of course, not bound by its own decisions, although we 
would expect it to at least acknowledge its former decisions when it engages in 
novel reasoning in direct conflict with them.
105
 However, the Court’s failure in 
Kirk to consider Clancy, Baxter
106
 and other authoritative Federation-era material 
                                                        
99  Baxter (1909) 10 CLR 114, 131 (Griffith CJ), 140 (Barton J). 
100  Ibid 140 (Barton J), 146 (O’Connor J), 161 (Isaacs J). 
101  Ibid 140 (Barton J) (‘The legislature has of course the power to make an inferior Court the sole 
custodian of the extent of its jurisdiction’) (emphasis added), 146 (O’Connor J) (‘It is, of course, 
open to the legislature to invest a tribunal with unlimited power, and should the enactment 
constituting it clearly express that intention, it would be the duty of this Court to give full effect to 
it’) (emphasis added). See also at 161 (Isaacs J).  
102  Ibid 131–2 (Griffith CJ), 138–41 (Barton J), 145–9 (O’Connor J), 156–61 (Isaacs J). 
103  Ibid 140–1. 
104  Ibid 132 (Griffith CJ), 148 (O’Connor J), 162 (Isaacs J). By contrast, Isaacs J, earlier in his 
judgment in Baxter, had opined that the new privative clause ‘does abolish prohibition in every 
form’: at 161.  
105  John v Federal Minister of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438–40 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 450–2 (Brennan J). The High Court’s decision in Kirk is also inconsistent 
with its decisions in Minister for Labour and Industry (New South Wales) v Mutual Life and 
Citizens’ Assurance Company Ltd (1922) 30 CLR 488; Morgan and Industrial Workers Union v 
Rylands Brothers (Australia) Limited (1927) 39 CLR 517; Houssein v Undersecretary, Department 
of Industrial Relations and Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88; and Public Service Association 
of South Australia v Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 
173 CLR 132; Minister for Labour and Industry (New South Wales) v Mutual Life and Citizens’ 
Assurance Company Limited (1922) 30 CLR 488, 496 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Starke 
JJ); Morgan and Industrial Workers Union v Rylands Brothers (Australia) Limited (1927) 39 CLR 
517, 524 (Isaacs ACJ and Powers J), 525 (Higgins J); Houssein v Undersecretary, Department of 
Industrial Relations and Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88, 95; Public Service Association of 
South Australia v Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 173 CLR 
132, 142 (Brennan J), 160–1 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ), 165 (McHugh J). Of these four 
inconsistent decisions, only Houssein v Undersecretary, Department of Industrial Relations and 
Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88 and Public Service Association of South Australia v 
Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia, South Australian Branch (1991) 173 CLR 132 were cited in 
Kirk (Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 571 n 188, 574 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ)) and the inconsistency of those two decisions with the holding in Kirk was not 
addressed. See also Gouliaditis, above n 3, 876 n 43. Cf Finn, above n 2, 100. 
106  Clancy was not cited at all in the Court’s decision in Kirk, and Baxter was accorded a single, scant 
citation (at Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 570 n 182) in relation to an unrelated point. Both Clancy and 
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is not merely a case of inadequate historical research and analysis. The 
interpretative maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege,
107
 
while of general application, should have especial weight in originalist reasoning; 
self-evidently, decisions of the Court from the first decade after Federation on the 
effectiveness of state privative clauses, delivered by justices who were involved in 
the drafting of the Australian Constitution and contemporary authorities such as 
the Convention Debates, are highly relevant to an argument about the 
interpretation of the Australian Constitution that relies on claims about accepted 
doctrine at the time of Federation. If the High Court is correct, in Kirk, about 
accepted doctrine at the time of Federation informing the content of the concept of 
a state Supreme Court in the Australian Constitution, one would expect High Court 
justices shortly after Federation to share that understanding in considered 
comments directly on point. On the contrary, as it was obvious and indisputable to 
the early High Court justices that the jurisdiction of the state Supreme Courts to 
issue prerogative writs to correct for jurisdictional errors could be taken away by 
the state Parliaments, how could that jurisdiction have been an essential 
characteristic of those very Supreme Courts at the time of Federation?  
It is telling to compare the on-Federation entrenchment theory — and the 
historical justification for it advanced by the High Court in Kirk — with the 
Court’s interpretation of the trial by jury guarantee in the Australian Constitution 
s 80 in Cheatle v The Queen.
108
 In Cheatle, the Court determined that the guarantee 
of trial by jury in relation to Commonwealth indictable offences contained in s 80 
incorporated a requirement of jury unanimity because unanimity was an ‘essential 
feature’ of the common law institution of the jury at the time of Federation.109 To 
that extent, the Court’s reasoning in Cheatle is analogous with the on-Federation 
entrenchment theory. However, a closer comparison of Cheatle and Kirk reveals 
two pertinent differences. 
The first difference relates to the on-Federation entrenchment theory itself. 
There is a much sounder textual foundation for the High Court’s reasoning in 
Cheatle than for the on-Federation entrenchment theory. The Australian 
Constitution contains a specific reference to the institution of trial by jury in s 80, 
and expressly limits the guarantee to prosecutions brought on indictment by the 
new entity of the Commonwealth.
110
  
The second difference relates to the historical justification for the on-
Federation entrenchment theory advanced by the High Court in Kirk. In Cheatle, 
the High Court cited tens of cases, several canonical commentators and a plethora 
of secondary materials in support of its historical argument about the practical 
                                                                                                                                
Baxter were, however, raised in argument: see Transcript of Proceedings, Kirk [2009] HCATrans 
239 (1 October 2009) 42–5. See also Gouliaditis, above n 3, 876 n 43. 
107  Translated as ‘in law, a contemporaneous definition is the best and strongest’: Butterworths, 
Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004) 91. 
108  (1993) 177 CLR 541 (‘Cheatle’). 
109  Ibid 552. 
110  See generally Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary 
View (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2010) 406–11; James Stellios, The Federal Judicature: Chapter III of the 
Constitution Commentary and Cases (LexisNexis, 2010) 517–68. 
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content of the s 80 guarantee.
111
 That wealth of historical material pointed 
unequivocally to a requirement of jury unanimity stretching back over many 
centuries to 1367.
112
 By contrast, in Kirk, the Court only extracted one ambiguous 
passage from one case, Willan,
113
 to support its originalist reasoning. As already 
noted, the Court also ignored a unanimous contemporary decision of the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Re Biel, and its own decisions in Clancy and 
Baxter, all cited in argument
114
 and all inconsistent with the Court’s reasoning. 
Moreover, the requirement of jury unanimity at issue in Cheatle is a concrete 
requirement that has persisted unchanged through several centuries, whereas the 
concept of jurisdictional error, which defines the boundaries of the entrenched 
minimum standard of judicial review, is not. 
B The Evolution of Administrative Law Post-Federation 
A further problem with the High Court’s originalist reasoning in Kirk is that relies 
on accepted doctrine concerning judicial review in 1900 in order to entrench the 
very different law of judicial review that exists today, without acknowledging the 
obvious methodological problems with this transition. It is beyond dispute that 
judicial supervision of government action is radically different now to how it was 
at the end of the 19
th
 century. In particular, there are four related changes that have 
occurred in the period between the end of the 19
th
 century and the present day that 
further undermine the High Court’s originalist justification for the on-Federation 
entrenchment theory, even if one ignores the fact that the theory is utterly 
inconsistent with the contemporary historical materials.  
The first change is that government decision-makers are now far more 
likely to make a legal error in the course of decision-making than they were at the 
time of Federation. This is, in part, a consequence of the increase in the amount 
and complexity of legislation that confers and regulates decision-making powers. 
However, it is also a result of the imposition of novel and stricter standards upon 
government decision-makers by courts. The expansion of the procedural fairness 
ground of judicial review is a case in point. At the end of the 19
th
 century, the 
requirements of a classically curial concept of natural justice only applied to 
several well-established categories of decision-makers; now an evolving obligation 
to afford ‘procedural fairness’ applies presumptively to all decision makers.115 
The second change relates to the availability of the writs of prohibition and 
certiorari. At the end of the 19
th
 century, the writs were largely confined to the 
review of decision-making by inferior courts and a limited range of other bodies 
                                                        
111  Cheatle (1993) 177 CLR 541, 550–62.  
112  Ibid 550. 
113  (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 433 
114  See above nn 64, 106. 
115  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57, 93 
(McHugh J). See also Basten, above n 2, 280–1, 288; Robin Creyke, John McMillan and Mark 
Smyth, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2012) 
562. See generally Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 106–8, 117–22, 414–26. Cf R v Arndel 
(1906) 3 CLR 557, 571–2 (Griffith CJ), 574–9 (Barton J), 582 (O’Connor J); Harrison Moore, The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 96–7.  
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exercising ‘quasi-judicial’ functions.116 Over the course of the 20th century, the 
writs become available against a much broader range of decision-makers.
117
  
The third change relates to the availability of mandamus. In the 19
th
 century, 
an applicant for mandamus was required to prove that he or she had made a 
specific demand for performance of the duty that was sought to be enforced,
118
 and 
a court would only grant the remedy if there was no other effective remedy 
available to the applicant.
119
 By contrast, in the 20
th
 century, these requirements 
ceased to be requirements, and became instead relevant factors in determining 
whether the writ was granted.
120
 Further, in the 19
th
 century, mandamus was 
largely confined to an actual failure to exercise jurisdiction;
121
 in the 20
th
 century 
judges showed an increasing willingness to find that a decision-maker had 
constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by making a jurisdictional error in the 
process of making a decision.
122
  
                                                        
116  See Ex parte King (1861) 2 Legge 1307, 1316; R v Nicholl (1862) 1 QSCR 42, 43; Re Slack (1871) 2 
VLR (L) 135, 136; R v Board of Education (1871) 2 VLR (L) 176, 178–9; Ex parte Thackeray (1874) 
13 NSWSCR (L) 1, 50–1; Re Boddington (1880) 14 SALR 68, 75; Re Lange and the Licensed 
Victuallers Act (1880) 14 SALR 150; R v Hamilton; Ex parte Attorney-General (1881) 7 VLR (L) 
194, 199; Ex parte M’Innes (1883) 4 NSWLR (L) 143, 148–9; R v Maude; Ex parte Ryan (1888) 14 
VLR 227, 237; Holmes v Cohuna Irrigation and Water Supply Trust (1893) 19 VLR 429, 431; R v 
Edwards; Ex parte Howells (1896) 7 QLJR 25, 26; R v Sharman; Ex parte Denton [1898] 1 QB 578, 
579–80; R v Bowman [1898] 1 QB 663; R v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802, 806. See also Gouliaditis, 
above n 3, 878 n 51. See generally Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 799, 812–15.  
117  See generally Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 72–3, 812–13. By contrast, the prerogative writ 
of mandamus has always been available against persons or bodies exercising non-judicial functions 
other than the Crown, to the extent that the decision-maker is under a public duty to perform the 
function: at 835–6. See also Ex parte Hamilton (1859) 2 Legge 1233; R v Registrar-General; R v 
Municipal Council of East Collingwood (1861) 1 W & W (L) 1; Irving v Mayor and Councillors of 
Footscray (1866) 3 W W & A’B (L) 9; R v Medical Board of Victoria (1867) 4 W W & A’B (L) 139; 
R v Registrar-General; Ex parte Roxburgh (1868) 1 QSCR 201; Smith v Mayor of Clunes (1868) 5 W 
W & A’B (L) 86; Ex parte Attenborough; Re Bent (1868) 5 W W & A’B (L) 103, 105; Ex parte Mills; 
Re Mills (1881) 1 QLJR 1; Ex parte Gibson (1881) 2 NSWLR (L) 203; R v President of the Shire of 
Oakleigh; Ex parte Wilson (1884) 10 VLR (L) 67; Re Glenelg Shire; Ex parte Sealey (1885) 11 VLR 
64, 69; Re O’Rourke (1886) 7 NSWLR (L) 64, 70; Re Carroll; Ex parte Dagnall (1888) 14 VLR 607; 
Re Barnes (1889) 15 VLR 237; R v Central Board of Health; Ex parte Wilson (1889) 15 VLR 375; 
Re Bollen and South Australian Medical Board (1889) 23 SALR 107; R v Gee (1889) 23 SALR 164; 
Re Wall (1890) 16 VLR 686; Re Transfer of Land Act 1890; Ex parte Clark (1891) 17 VLR 82; 
Ex parte Bourchier (1892) 13 NSWLR (L) 105; Ex parte New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency 
(1893) 14 NSWLR (L) 96, 99; R v President of the Shire of Winchelsea (1896) 12 VLR 171; R v 
Medical Board of Queensland (1896) 7 QLJR 122; Stalker v Commissioner of Crown Lands (1897) 
1 TLR 23; R v Bourne; Ex parte Spresser (1897) 8 QLJR 14; Ex parte Atkins; Re Warden of Evandale 
(1898) 1 TLR 70, 74–5; R v Bowman [1898] 1 QB 663; R v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802; Re Municipal 
District of Lambton (1899) 20 NSWLR (L) 375; Re Municipal District of Lambton (No 2) (1899) 20 
NSWLR (L) 378; Re Council of the Shire of East Loddon; Ex parte Cheyne (1899) 24 VLR 703. 
Contra, in relation to the availability of the writ of mandamus, Emilios Kyrou, ‘Judicial Review of 
Decisions of Non-Governmental Bodies Exercising Governmental Powers: Is Datafin Part of 
Australian Law?’ (2012) 86 Australian Law Journal 20. 
118  Short and Mellor, above n 34, 27. See also R v Arndel (1906) 3 CLR 557, 568–9 (Griffith CJ). 
119  Short and Mellor, above n 34, 24–6. 
120  Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 72–3, 833–4. 
121  See, eg, R v Fawcett; Ex parte Hodson (1868) LT NS 396; R v Nicholson [1899] 2 QB 455; Short 
and Mellor, above n 34, 13. See also R v Brown (1857) 7 El & Bl 757; 119 ER 1427. But see R v 
Adamson (1875) 1 QBD 201. 
122  See, eg, R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228, 242–3 
(Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ). See also NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
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The fourth change relates to the development of the concept of 
jurisdictional error. Putting to one side the remedy of certiorari for error of law on 
the face of the record
123
 (which the High Court in Kirk expressly recognised as a 
distinct remedy which was not entrenched),
124
 in the 19
th
 century, provided a 
decision-maker commenced with jurisdiction, any subsequent legal error a 
decision-maker made was generally irremediable at common law.
125
 A survey of 
19
th
-century law reveals only limited circumstances in which a decision-maker 
who commenced with jurisdiction could lose it: the legal error had to be related to 
matters that were genuinely preliminary or ‘collateral’;126 the decision-maker was 
an inferior court (or other ‘quasi-judicial’ decision-maker) and acted in breach of a 
limited, curial conception of natural justice;
127
 the decision-maker made its 
decision in the complete absence of evidence
128
 or on the basis of clear and 
                                                                                                                                
Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, 484 (Gummow J). See generally Aronson, Dwyer and 
Groves, above n 3, 835.  
123  See generally Wade and Forsyth, above n 34, 268–9; Cane and McDonald, above n 17, 84–6. See 
also Ex parte Blackwell; Re Hateley [1965] 2 NSWLR 1061, 1063.  
124  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 567, 581 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
See also Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 3, 203–4; Lacey, above n 2, 658. 
125  R v Bolton (1841) 1 QB 66, 74; 113 ER 1054, 1057; Ex parte Hopwood (1850) 15 QB 121, 128; 
117 ER 404, 407; R v Wood (1855) 5 El & Bl 49, 56; 119 ER 400, 403; R v Bindon, Ex parte 
Cairns (1879) 5 VLR (L) 93, 96–7; R v Cope, Ex parte the Mayor of Essendon and Flemington 
(1881) 7 VLR (L) 337, 346; R v Edney; Ex parte Skinner (1882) 8 VLR (L) 1; R v Justices of 
London [1895] 1 QB 214, 217; Ex parte Minister for Lands (1896) 17 NSWLR (L) 394, 400–1; R v 
Casey (1897) 13 VLR 495, 498. See generally P P Craig, Administrative Law (Thomson, 5th ed, 
2003) 490–1; Wade and Forsyth, above n 34, 258–60, 262–3; Woolf, Jowell and Le Sueur, above 
n 34, 181–2; Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 11–12.  
126  See, eg, Bunbury v Fuller (1853) 9 Ex 111, 140; 156 ER 47, 60. See also R v Wrottesley (1830) 1 B & Ad 
648; 109 ER 928; R v Colling (1852) 17 QB 816; 117 ER 1493; R v Badger (1856) 6 El & Bl 137, 166–7; 
119 ER 816, 826; R v Brown (1857) 7 El & Bl 757; 119 ER 1427; R v Nunneley (1858) El Bl & El 852; 
120 ER 728; Pease v Chaytor (1863) 3 B & S 620, 636, 640–1; 122 ER 233, 239, 241; Elston v Rose 
(1868) LR 4 QB 4; Taylor v Nicholls (1876) 1 CPD 242. See generally Craig, above n 125, 491–2; 
Aronson, Dwyer and Groves, above n 3, 12; Wade and Forsyth, above n 34, 252–3, 258–60.  
127  Municipal Council of Prahran v Clough (1862) 1 W & W (L) 238; R v Myers (1875) 34 LT NS 
247; R v Justices of Great Yarmouth (1882) 8 QBD 525; Ex parte Webber (1886) 7 NSWLR (L) 
317, 321–2; Re O’Lachlan (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 54; R v Farrant (1887) 20 QBD 58; Woolcock v 
City of Collingwood (1889) 15 VLR 81; Purcell v Perpetual Trustee (1894) 15 NSWLR (L) 385, 
387; Ex parte Shakespeare (1894) 15 NSWLR (L) 477, 481; Re Scadden (1895) 16 NSWLR (L) 
125; Ex parte Martin (1896) 17 NSWLR (L) 200, 202; R v Court of Marine Inquiry (1898) 23 VLR 
179; Ex parte Mansfield (1899) 20 NSWLR (L) 75. See also Ex parte Hopwood (1850) 15 QB 121; 
117 ER 404; Paul v Buttenshaw (1877) 5 QSCR 8; 1(2) QLR 4; Markey v Murray (1884) 2 QLJR 
7; Burrey v Marine Board of Queensland (1892) 4 QLJR 151; R v Morris (1894) 6 QLJR 9; Raven 
v Queensland Divisional Board (1894) 6 QLJR 67; R v Tchorzewski (1897) 8 QLJR 79. Cf Re 
Balcombe; Ex parte Hann (1861) 1 W & W (L) 49. 
128  Re Bailey (1854) 3 El & Bl 607; 118 ER 1269; Re M‘Mullen (1859) 3 QSCR 205, 209; Ex parte 
Taylor, Re Rede (1863) 2 W & W(L) 19; Ex parte Barclay, Re Pasco (1863) 2 W & W (L) 38; 
Ogle v Townley (1872) 2 QSCR 202; Re Haughton (1877) 5 QSCR 53; R v Taylor; R v Walker; Ex 
parte Kennedy (1878) 4 VLR (L) 452; R v Taylor; Ex parte Blain (1879) 5 VLR (L) 271; R v 
Grover; Ex parte Parsons (1881) 7 VLR (L) 334; R v Little; Ex parte Reynolds (1882) 8 VLR (L) 
124; Dunn v Boyle (1884) 2 QLJR 25; R v Attorney-General; Ex parte Gillick (1885) 11 VLR 508, 
515; Re Scully (1886) 3 WN (NSW) 50, 51; Re Barnes (1889) 15 VLR 237; Ex parte Hales (1898) 
NSWLR (L) 378, 382; R v Lawrence (1899) 1 WALR 99, 102; Re Electoral Justices of Barcoo; Ex 
parte Collins (1899) 9 QLJR 111, 114. 
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manifest fraud;
129
 the decision-maker handed down a sentence, or made an order 
that was clearly ultra vires;
130
 or (exceptionally) the decision-maker took into 
account an irrelevant consideration or failed to take into account a relevant 
consideration.
131
 In contrast, by the end of the 20
th
 century, the so-called 
‘commencement theory of jurisdiction’ had been utterly discarded and replaced 
with a more or less open-ended list of remediable ‘jurisdictional errors’.132 Even 
more significantly, it is clear that, in the 19
th
 century, the catalogue of legal errors 
going to jurisdiction would largely, if not entirely, yield in the face of a strong 
privative clause,
133
 a point I will take up when I compare the Willan concept of 
‘manifest defect of jurisdiction’ with the modern concept of jurisdictional error.  
While the High Court in Kirk at least acknowledged some of these 
developments,
134
 it failed to acknowledge how these four related changes 
undermine its originalist reasoning concerning accepted doctrine and the essential 
characteristics of the state Supreme Courts at the time of Federation. The extract 
from Willan in the relevant passages in Kirk referred to the availability of the writ 
of certiorari to control the actions of inferior courts on grounds of ‘manifest defect 
of jurisdiction’ or ‘manifest fraud’ by the party procuring jurisdiction.135 Yet in 
Kirk the High Court jumped, without explanation, from this extract in Willan to a 
series of assertions about the prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition, 
mandamus, and habeas corpus,
136
 to control the exercise of state judicial and 
executive power,
137
 where the decision-maker has made any jurisdictional error, as 
presumably determined by 20
th
- and 21
st
-century Australian case law.
138
 Of all 
                                                        
129  See, eg, R v Gillyard (1848) 12 QB 527; 116 ER 965; R v Lawrence (1899) 1 WALR 99, 103 
(Hensman J). 
130  See, eg, R v Cridland (1857) 7 El & Bl 853; 119 ER 1463. See also Short and Mellor, above n 34, 
117. In referring to an order or sentence which is clearly ultra vires, I am referring to the type of 
example used by the High Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177. 
131  See, eg, R v Vestry of St Pancras (1890) 24 QBD 371; Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173. See also 
Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 96. 
132  As Gageler has pointed out, the term ‘jurisdictional error’ makes its first appearance in the 
Commonwealth Law Reports in 1954, and it is only referred to in passing in a few judgments of the 
High Court prior to the 1990s: Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of 
Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 95–6. See 
also Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State Administrative Law’, above n 3, 131; Meyers, 
above n 12, 142. See generally Cane and McDonald, above n 17, 149–53; Aronson, Dwyer and 
Groves, above n 3, 11–15, 171–2.  
133  See, eg, Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 35, 96. 
134  Kirk (2009) 239 CLR 531, 567–73 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
135  Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 442 as extracted in Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580 (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
136  See also Public Service Association of South Australia v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) 
(2012) 289 ALR 1, 16–17 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 20–2 (Heydon J); 
Lauren Butterly, ‘Public Service Association (SA) Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA)’ 
(2012) 20 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 11, 12–14. 
137  Cf Ex parte M’Innes (1883) 4 NSWLR (L) 143, 148–9 (Martin CJ). See also South Australia v 
Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 27 (French CJ), 78 (Hayne J); Public Service Association of South 
Australia v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 289 ALR 1, 10 (French CJ), 17 
(Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 20–4 (Heydon J); Gouliaditis, above n 3, 871 
n 51; Basten, above n 2, 283, 296, 299; Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 3, 204–5; Butterly, above 
n 136, 14–15. See generally Groves, above n 3, 425–7. 
138  See, eg, Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 92–101 (Gaudron and 
Gummow JJ). See also Public Service Association of South Australia v Industrial Relations 
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those precarious leaps, there is one which merits particular scrutiny: the leap from 
the reference in Willan to ‘manifest defect of jurisdiction’ to that in Kirk to 
‘jurisdictional error’.  
Gageler has asserted that the origins of the modern concept of jurisdictional 
error are to be found in the passages in Willan that refer to ineffectiveness of the 
privative clause to oust judicial review on the ground of ‘manifest defect in 
jurisdiction’.139 That may be so, but it is also clear that, both in theory and in 
substance, the ground of manifest defect of jurisdiction referred to in Willan 
provided a much narrower basis for judicial review in the face of a strong privative 
clause than judicial review based on the ever-evolving early 21
st
-century Australian 
concept of jurisdictional error.
140
 While Willan has been cited as an authority for a 
limited exception to the commencement theory of jurisdiction in the case of 
‘jurisdictional facts’,141 the Privy Council in Willan was almost entirely wedded to 
the commencement theory of jurisdiction, as most famously articulated by the 
Court of Queen’s Bench in R v Bolton in 1841.142 An example of the difference 
between the concept of jurisdiction at the turn of the 20
th
 century and the modern 
concept of jurisdiction is provided by the first edition of Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, published in 1909, which asserts, ‘[w]here certiorari is taken away by 
statute, even if it appears on the face of the proceedings that there was no evidence 
whatever in support of a conviction, the writ would not be granted’ and cites Re 
Shropshire Justices; Ex parte Blewitt
143
 (a case ‘where the magistrate convicted on 
the faith of a charge by a police constable, without any hearing of the complaint, or 
plea of guilty or witnesses called’) in support of the assertion.144 By contrast, it is 
inconceivable today that any magistrate who convicted a defendant purely on the 
faith of the informant’s charge and in the complete absence of any evidence led by 
the prosecution could escape a finding that he or she had made a jurisdictional 
error should the decision be judicially reviewed. It is noteworthy that Wade and 
Forsyth are of the view that the reference in Willan to ‘manifest defect of 
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jurisdiction’ was the precursor to the so called ‘Hickman principle’145 which 
protects judicial review in the face of a strong privative clause, but does so on a 
narrower basis than the ‘full range of jurisdictional error’146 now entrenched by the 
holding in Kirk.
147
  
While identifying some of the discrepancies between the scope of judicial 
review asserted in Willan and the scope of judicial review based on the modern 
concept of jurisdictional error, Knackstredt has suggested that the High Court’s 
reasoning in Kirk may be supported by reference to what he terms the ‘trite’ 
observation ‘that the Constitution is a living document and is to be interpreted in 
the light of the development of the common law’.148 To that suggestion, I make 
three objections.  
My first is that Knackstredt’s observation is hardly trite. It runs directly 
counter to originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, which the High 
Court has arguably employed for most of its existence.
149
 If the notion that the 
Australian Constitution could entrench dynamic, judge-made common law was 
really uncontroversial, we might have expected the High Court to rely on that 
notion expressly in Kirk, rather than invoking originalist reasoning.  
My second objection is that while the text of the Australian Constitution 
contains numerous expressions, such as ‘copyrights’150 or ‘bills of exchange’,151 
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which can only be understood by reference to judge-made law,
152
 the so-called 
‘constitutional expression’153 of the ‘Supreme Courts of the States’ cannot 
convincingly be placed in the same category. State Supreme Courts are institutions 
that, as detailed in Part III, were established, either directly or indirectly, by 
legislative fiat in the 19
th
 century. It is one thing to refer to evolving common law 
principles to interpret a specific term in the text of the Australian Constitution, 
such as ‘a writ … of prohibition’ in s 75(v), which ‘has no meaning other than as a 
technical legal expression’154 and which has clearly been shaped over the centuries, 
both pre- and post-Federation, by judge-made law.
155
 It is another altogether to 
pluck a term from the text of the Australian Constitution which contains a ‘cryptic 
reference’156 to an institution created by legislation, and invest it, by the ‘draw[ing] 
[of] sweeping inferences’,157 with a meaning that entrenches an evolving corpus of 
judge-made law.  
My third objection relates to the fluidity and breadth of the concept of 
jurisdictional error. My objection, of course, is not to the work of judges in 
developing and expanding the concept of jurisdictional error in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries, but to the linking of that common law concept to accepted doctrine at the 
time of Federation and an originalist interpretation of the term ‘Supreme Court of 
any State’ in s 73 of the Australian Constitution. Jurisdictional error, as an ‘ever 
expanding concept’158 ‘almost entirely unbound by principle’,159 is significantly 
different from other, more historically determined common law concepts that 
inform the interpretation of the text of the Australian Constitution, such as, for 
example, the common law concept of property, which informs the interpretation of 
the reference to property in the text of s 51(xxxi),
160
 or indeed the concept of ‘trial 
by jury’ analysed in Cheatle.161 Ironically, the High Court’s decision in Kirk adds 
force to my objection: in Kirk the Court was at pains to point out that the numerous 
categories of jurisdictional error it had previously identified in 1995 in Craig v 
South Australia
162
 are ‘not to be seen as providing a rigid taxonomy of 
jurisdictional error’ but are merely ‘examples’.163  
V Conclusion 
There are a number of good policy reasons that can be advanced to justify the 
entrenchment of a minimum standard of judicial review in the state jurisdictions. 
                                                        
152  See W M C Gummow, ‘The Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of Australian Law?’ (2005) 79 
Australian Law Journal 167, 172–3.  
153  Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 141 (Gummow J). 
154  Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 93 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
155  See, eg, ibid 93–101 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also Goldsworthy, above n 3, 306 n 6. 
156  Sackville, ‘The Constitutionalisation of State Administrative Law’, above n 3, 131. 
157  Ibid.  
158  Gouliaditis, above n 3, 883. 
159  Knackstredt, above n 140, 211. See also Finn, above n 2, 103–4. But see Basten, above n 2, 287. 
160  See Gummow, above n 152, 173. See also Basten, above n 2, 280.  
161  (1993) 177 CLR 541. 
162  (1995) 184 CLR 163. 
163  Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 574 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See 
also Finn, above n 2, 94–6, 103; Young and Murray, above n 8, 131; Groves, above n 3, 414–15; 
Lacey, above n 2, 649, 658–60; Vial, above n 2, 153–4. But see Basten, above n 2, 291. 
806 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 35:781 
There are also a number of good policy reasons for the entrenchment of a 
minimum standard of review in the state jurisdictions based on jurisdictional error, 
given the High Court’s jurisprudence on the entrenched minimum standard of 
judicial review in the Commonwealth jurisdiction and the existence of a unified 
Australian common law.
164
 However, it is not legitimate for judges to propound a 
novel interpretation of the Australian Constitution based on policy reasons alone. 
In Kirk, the High Court purported to provide a legal justification for the 
entrenchment in the state jurisdictions of a minimum standard of judicial review 
based on jurisdictional error using originalist reasoning to interpret the Australian 
Constitution. In this paper I have argued that this originalist reasoning is seriously 
flawed. In striving to arrive at a ‘happy ending’165 for both the convicted 
defendants in Kirk and the rule of law under the Australian Constitution, the Court 
has engaged in some well-meaning but sloppy thinking in interpreting the 
Australian Constitution based on a half-truth. It has accurately alluded to the 
practice of statutory interpretation that allowed the colonial courts to preserve 
judicial review in the face of strong privative clauses, but has ignored the critical 
qualification to that practice: the supremacy of the colonial Parliaments over the 
colonial courts.  
In particular, the entrenchment of judicial review centred on a modern 
concept of jurisdictional error is incompatible with any originalist conception of 
the essential characteristics of the state Supreme Courts. Even if one accepts, for 
the sake of argument, the proposition that the common law interpretative practices 
of the Supreme Courts in the colonial era justify the entrenchment of some form of 
judicial review as an essential characteristic of those courts on Federation, it 
stretches all credulity to accept that an essential characteristic of those courts at the 
time of Federation encompassed the modern concept of jurisdictional error. The 
fluidity and breadth of the concept of jurisdictional error enhance the power of the 
judiciary. They create greater uncertainty about the validity of executive action, 
which can only be conclusively dispelled by the judiciary ‘marking the boundaries 
of the relevant field’.166 If jurisdictional error were solely confined to the common 
law, this manifestation of judicial power would be of only minor constitutional 
significance, given the supremacy of Parliament over the common law. But the 
critical constitutional issue is the extent to which this perpetually evolving corpus 
of law regulating the activities of democratically accountable governments, which 
was historically formulated and developed in a common law setting, may 
legitimately be entrenched within the Australian Constitution.
167
 The High Court’s 
flawed originalist reasoning in Kirk is a fig leaf, which conceals the reality of 
judicial creativity and avoids engagement with this critical constitutional issue. 
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Given that the Court’s originalist reasoning in Kirk is seriously flawed, the other 
justifications for entrenchment of a minimum standard of judicial review in the 
state jurisdictions based on jurisdictional error, which were only touched upon in 
Kirk, need to be developed and articulated with a much higher degree of 
thoroughness and rigour.  
